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NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY FROM ANTITRUST
LIABILITY UNDER CLIPPER EXXPRESS V ROCKY
MOUNTAIN MOTOR TARIFF B UREA , INC:
REPLACING THE SHAM EXCEPTION WITH
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Federal antitrust laws prohibit activity that restrains trade or
reduces competition.' The antitrust statutes' prohibitions collide with
first amendment rights2 when the trade restaint results from petitioning
the government. In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.3 and United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,4 the
Supreme Court held that activity is immune from antitrust liability if
the imposition of such liability would infringe upon the actor's right to
petition the government. This Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not, how-
ever, protect ostensible petitioning that is "a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with. . . a
competitor." 5
Considerable confusion has developed regarding what one party
must show to establish that another party has engaged in "sham" peti-
tioning.6 Some courts have automatically awarded alleged petitioning
activity a Noerr-Pennington exemption from antitrust liability and then
have had to determine whether that activity fit into a "sham exception,"
which would make the activity susceptible to renewed antitrust chal-
lenges. 7 In Cz'per Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Ta~ifBureau, Inc.,8 the
Ninth Circuit replaced this "exception-to-the-exemption" analysis with
a clear first amendment analysis; under the Ninth Circuit's approach,
Noerr-Pennington immunity attaches only if the activity at issue is pro-
tected by the first amendment. 9
1 See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of
the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances").
3 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
4 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
5 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144
(1961).
6 See infia notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
7 The Supreme Court formulated this analysis in California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); subsequent lower court decisions have further de-
veloped it in interpreting California Motor Transport. See infia notes 38-57 and accompanying
text.
8 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
9 Id at 1255.
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This Note asserts that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine's history indi-
cates that the Supreme Court based the doctrine squarely on the first
amendment. 10 It argues that the Clipper court's first amendment ap-
proach to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is sounder than prior courts' ex-
ception-to-the-exemption analysis." It examines the two types of
activity that do not deserve Noerr-Pennington immunity under a first
amendment approach-sham petitioning 12 and petitioning that the
government may constitutionally restrict. 13 Finally, this Note demon-
strates that the Clipper court's constitutional approach is, for all forms of
petitioning, doctrinally consistent with the existing body of Noerr-Pen-
nington case law. 14
I
BACKGROUND
The basic goals of antitrust laws are to protect competition and
prevent monopolies. 15 Antitrust doctrine is for the most part judicially
created, 16 as are various immunities from antitrust coverage. 17 One
10 See infra notes 15-57 and accompanying text.
11 See in/ra notes 100-21 and accompanying text.
12 See in/ra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
13 See infa notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
14 See in/ia notes 131-64 and accompanying text.
15 See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951) C" 'Congress was dealing with
competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.' ") (quot-
ing Staley Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 135 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1943)). See generall 1 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 103 (1978). Specifically, two goals underlie antitrust law: an
economic goal of maximizing productivity through efficient allocation of finite resources
among competing users, and a populist goal that considers noneconomic factors, such as
broadening economic opportunity. See id.
Antitrust law plays an important role in the American economic structure, where the
public sector exercises limited control over a private sector that makes the basic economic
decisions. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws
in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as
the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.").
16 Although the Sherman and Clayton Acts and their legislative history are regarded as
inexplicit and unilluminating, they form the foundation for a large body of case law. See 1 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, 106.
17 Professor Kennedy distinguishes between "exemptions" and "immunities." Kennedy,
Political Boycotts, the Sherman Act, and the First Amendment: An Accommodation of Competing Interests,
55 S. CAL. L. REV. 983, 993 n.43 (1982) (" 'Exemption' implies that the activity would be
covered by the Act except for some other act of Congress that removes it from coverage.
'Immunity' implies that Congress did not intend that the activity be covered in the first
place."). This distinction is not altogether accurate. Although a distinction, albeit inconse-
quential for the purposes of this discussion, may exist between judicially-created exemptions,
see, e.g., Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240, 1254-
55 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[t]he Noerr-Permington doctrine is. . . a judicially created exception to the
application of the antitrust laws'), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983), and legislatively-created
exemptions, see, e.g., Capper-Volsted Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (1982) (agricultural and horti-
cultural organizations); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982) (labor, agricultural and horticul-
tural organizations); Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1982) (export trade
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such immunity, the Noerr-Pennington immunity, is based on the principle
that "no violation of [antitrust laws] can be predicated upon mere at-
tempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws."' 8
A. The Origins of the Immunity: Noerr and Pennington
The Supreme Court first considered whether antitrust immunity
should attach to efforts to influence governmental decisionmaking in
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.19 In Noerr,
an organization of railroad companies hired a public relations firm to
direct a publicity campaign against the trucking industry that allegedly
was "designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws. . . destruc-
tive of the trucking business."' 20 The railroads' lobbying convinced the
governor of Pennsylvania to veto a bill that would have increased the
weight limit for trucks on state highways.21 The truckers filed an anti-
trust action against the railroads, 22 claiming that the defendants had
conspired to restrain trade in, and monopolize, the long-distance freight
business in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 23
The Noerr Court rejected the truckers' claim, holding that "the
Sherman Act does not apply to the activities of the railroads at least
insofar as those activities comprised mere solicitation of governmental
action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws."'24 The
Court construed the limits of the Sherman Act to be coterminous with
the boundaries of first amendment protection but it did not explicitly
ground its holding in the Constitution.2 5 Instead, the Court pointed to
three considerations that together precluded application of the antitrust
laws to the defendants' activities. First, the Court emphasized the "es-
sential dissimilarity between an agreement jointly to seek legislation or
law enforcement and the agreements traditionally condemned by § 1 of
associations); the term "exemption" itself does not imply the latter and the term "immunity"
does not imply the former. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 795
(4th ed. 1976) ("exemption. . . : freedom from any charge or obligation to which others are
subject: immunity"); id. at 1130 ("immunity . . . : freedom or exemption from a charge,
duty, obligation . . . especially as granted by law to a person or class of persons').
Is Noen', 365 U.S. at 135. Even if a plaintiff establishes that a defendant's activity is
undeserving of Noetr-Pennington immunity, the court will not automatically enter judgment for
plaintiff. The plaintiff still must prove that the defendant has actually violated the antitrust
laws. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, 201.
19 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
20 Id at 129.
21 Id at 130 ("the 'Fair Truck Bill'. .. would have permitted truckers to carry heavier
loads over Pennsylvania roads").
22 Id at 129.
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
24 365 U.S. at 138.
25 See id at 137-38; see also Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to In&ence Government
Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 80, 82-84
(1977).
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the [Sherman] Act."'26 Second, the Court argued that a contrary holding
would impair the government's power to "act in [its] representative ca-
pacity" by preventing the people from making their wishes known to
their representatives.2 7 Finally, the Court contended that a construction
of the Sherman Act that would have prohibited the defendants' activity
"would raise important constitutional questions," adding that "[t]he
right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights,
and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade
these freedoms. '"28
At the end of the majority opinion, Justice Black cautioned that the
immunity would not automatically extend to any activity susceptible of
being labelled as "petitioning"; he noted that activity "ostensibly di-
rected toward influencing governmental action [that] is a mere sham to
cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere di-
rectly with the business relationships of a competitor" would not receive
Noerr-Pennington protection. 29 This statement became the foundation for
the confusing and often misleading exception-to-the-exemption inter-
pretation of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 30
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,3 1 the Court extended
the immunity granted in Noerr to activities designed to influence public
officials who act in a nonlegislative capacity. 32 In Pennington, the United
Mine Workers Union (UMW) was accused3 3 of conspiring with certain
large coal operators to urge the Secretary of Labor to establish a high
minimum wage for coal workers, and to dissuade the Tennessee Valley
Authority from buying nonunion coal. 34 The UMW and the large oper-
ators hoped that these governmental actions would drive the small coal
operators out of the market. 35
The Pennington Court interpreted Noerr as "shield[ing] from the
26 365 U.S. at 136.
27 Id at 137.
28 Id at 138.
29 Id at 144.
30 See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
31 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
32 See Fischel, supra note 25, at 85-86.
33 The UMW sued the owners of the Phillips Brothers Coal Company for unpaid roy-
alty payments; the defendants filed an answer and a counterclaim alleging an antitrust con-
spiracy. 381 U.S. at 659.
34 See id at 660.
35 The UMW and the large coal companies agreed to a scheme by which they would
eliminate the smaller companies. "The [large] companies and the union jointly and success-
fully approached the Secretary of Labor to obtain . . . a minimum wage for employees of
contractors selling coal to the TVA, such minimum wage being much higher than in other
industries and making it difficult for small companies to compete. . . ." Id at 660. Addi-
tionally, the conspirators "urged [the TVA] to curtail its spot market purchases" for nonunion
coal. Id at 660-61.
The union hoped that the scheme would result in increased wages, increased royalty
payments into the welfare fund, and effective control over the fund's use. The large coal
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Sherman Act ... concerted effort[s] to influence public officials regard-
less of intent or purpose."3 6 The Court therefore found the defendant's
activity to be immune from the antitrust laws. Although the Court in
Pennington did not directly refer to sham activity, its choice of the phrase
"concerted effort to influence public officials" 37 intimates that it re-
garded only sincere attempts to affect governmental decisionmaking as
deserving of immunity.
B. The Extention of Immunity to Adjudication and the Creation
of the Sham "Exception": California Motor Transport
The Noerr and Pennington opinions did not contain any express refer-
ence to an "exception" to antitrust immunity.38 In both cases, the Court
simply noted that if the activities at issue are not genuine efforts to influ-
ence governmental decisionmaking, the rationale underlying the Noerr-
Pennington immunity, and thus the immunity itself, do not apply.3 9 The
Supreme Court first mentioned a sham "exception" to Noerr-Pennington
immunity in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unimited,40 a case
involving a suit between two associations of trucking firms. The com-
plaint alleged that the defendant association had attempted to prevent
the plaintiff firms from entering the California market by instituting ad-
ministrative and judicial proceedings "so as to deny them 'free and un-
limited access' -41 to the courts and administrative agencies involved.
companies, in return, would obtain control over the market upon elimination of the smaller
companies. Id at 660.
36 Id at 670. "Intent or purpose" here refers to the UMW's ultimate goal of squeezing
the smaller operator out of the market. Read in context with the rest of the Pennington opin-
ion, the statement quoted above means that even if the UMW desired such an anticompeti-
tive result, its apparent effort to influence the Secretary of Labor deserves protection from
antitrust laws because it was a concerted effort to influence governmental decisionmaking.
Cf Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891, 896 (2d Cir. 1981) (defendants'
appeals were denied immunity because "defendants had no reasonable hopes of winning");
Mark Aero, Inc. v. TWA, 580 F.2d 288, 297 (8th Cir. 1978) (activities-including a publicity
campaign, attempts to induce others to make false and misleading statements, and economic
coercion-held immune from antitrust laws because defendant genuinely sought to influence
the Federal Aviation Administration).
For consistency, this Note uses the term "intent" to refer to a party's ultimate goal (e.g.,
the UMW's "intent" was to force the smaller operators out of the market). The Note uses the
terms "genuinely seek" or "sincere effort" to refer to a concerted effort to influence public
officials.
37 381 U.S. at 670.
38 The Noenr Court referred to a "sham," 365 U.S. at 144, but not to an "exception."
The Court in Pennington referred to neither.
39 See supra notes 29-30, 36-37 and accompanying text.
40 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
41 Id at 511.
The conspiracy alleged is a concerted action by [the defendants] to institute
state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat applications by [the plain-
tiffs] to acquire operating rights or to transfer or register those rights. These
activities, it is alleged, extend to rehearings and to reviews or appeals from
agency or court decisions on these matters.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, recognized that "[t]he right of
access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition" 42
and concluded that potential imposition of antitrust liability would im-
pair this first amendment right.43 Thus, the California Motor Transport
Court extended Noerr-Pennrg/on immunity to efforts to influence govern-
mental decisionmaking in the adjudicative context and correctly based
the immunity on the first amendment right to petition the government.
At the same time, Justice Douglas carved out an "exception" to the
Noerr-Pennington immunity. The plaintiffs did not allege that the defend-
ants intended "'to influence public officials,' but that they sought to bar
their competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and
so to usurp that decisionmaking process."'44 Justice Douglas concluded
that "such a purpose or intent . . . would be 'to discourage and ulti-
mately to prevent the [plaintiffs] from invoking' the processes of the ad-
ministrative agencies and courts and thus fall within the exception to
Nerr". "45
Justice Douglas acknowledged the difficulty of discerning whether
a party's litigation activities constitute an abuse of process from which
antitrust liability may result. 46 But in a passage often cited by lower
courts as setting out requirements for the applicability of the sham ex-
ception, 47 Douglas attempted to distinguish bona fide petitioning from
sham activity by stating "[o]ne claim, which a court or agency may
think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims
may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administra-
tive and judicial processes have been abused. '48 The Court found that
the Califomia Motor Transport plaintiffs' allegations concerning the de-
fendants' access barring activities on their face fell within the sham "ex-
ception" to Noerr-Pennington immunity and remanded the case for trial. 49
Id at 509. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had reversed a federal district court's
dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
42 Id at 510. Other forms of petitioning include: lobbying for legislative action, Noerr,
365 U.S. 127; attempts to influence executive action, Pennington, 381 U.S. 657; and political
boycotts, see infra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. See also Fischel, supra note 25, at 82-88.
43 We conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of peti-
tion to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating
the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal agen-
cies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolu-
tion of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis their competitors.
404 U.S. at 510-11.
44 Ia at 512 (quoting Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670). The Court "[took] the allegations of
the complaint at face value" because it was reviewing the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the
district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 404 U.S. at
515.
45 404 U.S. at 512 (quoting id at 518 (Stewart, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
46 See 404 U.S. at 513.
47 See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
48 404 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added).
49 Seeid at 516.
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Although the California Motor Transport Court's conclusion is consis-
tent with Noerr,50 the Court's analysis is flawed. Justice Douglas, in
"adapt[ing Noerr] to the adjudicatory process," 51 reasoned that the mere
act of filing suit constitutes petitioning and therefore merits Noerr-Pen-
nington protection without a preliminary inquiry into whether the plain-
tiff bringing the initial suit genuinely sought to prevail.52 Consequently,
the party seeking to establish that the plaintiffs actions violate the anti-
trust laws must show that the plaintiffs suit was a sham before this pre-
sumptive immunity is removed. This analysis conflicts with the
reasoning of the Noe'rr Court, which clearly indicated that any insincere
effort to influence governmental action is unworthy of immunity in the
first instance.53
The unfortunate result of the Calimforia Motor Transport opinion was
the creation of a confusing approach to Noerr-Pennington immunity:54 the
exception-to-the-exemption analysis. Using this approach, a court first
presumes that any act of filing a claim or lodging a protest is protected
and then determines whether the activity fits within the sham "excep-
tion" Justice Douglas outlined in California Motor Transport.55 As a result
of the lower courts' differing interpretations of Justice Douglas's lan-
guage and, thus, their adoption of disparate "requirements" for a find-
ing of sham activity, parties trying to demonstrate the presence of the
sham "exception" face a myriad of evidentiary requirements.56 Justice
50 The Court's holding that defendants' activity is subject to antitrust liability is consis-
tent with the Noerr Court's statement that Noerr-Pennington immunity does not extend to activ-
ity that is not "directed toward influencing governmental action." Noaer, 365 U.S. at 144.
Here, defendants used the judicial and administrative proceedings only to "harass and deter
[plaintiffs]. . . so as to deny them 'free and unlimited access' to those tribunals." 404 U.S. at
511.
51 404 U.S. at 516.
52 The California Motor Transport Court stated that the right of access to the courts "is
part of the right of petition protected by the First Amendment," id at 513, implying that
"access" to the courts is the protected right and not the actual attempt to influence govern-
mental decisionmaking. The Court seemed to indicate that any act of "accessing" the courts
constitutes petitioning.
One finds further support for this interpretation in the Court's long discussion support-
ing its statement that first amendment protection "does not necessarily give [the defendants]
immunity from the antitrust laws." Id This statement indicates that the Court considered
the defendants' behavior an exercise of a first amendment right. Additionally, the lengthy
discussions accompanying the statement would have been unnecessary had the Court con-
cluded that the defendants' activity was outside the scope of first amendment protection be-
cause it was not designed to influence governmental decisionmaking.
53 See supra text accompanying note 29.
54 See Balmer, Sham Litigation and the Antitnist Laws, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 39, 47 (1980).
55 See supra text accompanying note 46. For examples of applications of this approach,
see Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1982); Landmarks
Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981); Virginia Academy of Clinical Psy-
chologists v. Blue Shield, 625 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981);
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary
Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
56 See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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Douglas's vague discussion of practices that may result in antitrust lia-
bility makes a court's task in determining applicability of the Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity even more difficult.57
II
CLIPPER EXxPRESS V ROCKY MOUNTAIN MOTOR TARIFF
BUREA , INC.
The Ninth Circuit attempted to clear up this confusion in Clipper
Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor TarifBureau, Inc.58 The court rejected
the exception-to-the-exemption approach, choosing instead to employ a
clear first amendment analysis to determine the applicability of Noerr-
Pennington immunity. The Cizpper court's approach is doctrinally consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's holdings in Noerr, Pennington and California
Motor Transport and is easier for trial courts to apply. Moreover, it pro-
tects first amendment rights that may be compromised under the excep-
tion-to-the-exemption approach.
A. Facts and Procedural Posture
Clipper Exxpress was an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)-
regulated freight forwarder 59 competing in the motor shipping market.
The defendants were certain ICC-regulated trucking companies and a
rate bureau, Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau (RMMTB), which
established freight rates for its member firms. 60 To compete with unreg-
ulated forwarders, Clipper gradually reduced its rates.6 1 The defend-
57 404 U.S. at 513 ("[t]here are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice
which may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust
violations"). Justice Douglas, however, gave no clear indication of what constitues "reprehen-
sible practice." See Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (10th
Cir. 1982) (court reluctant to find defendant's suit a sham in part because "the Supreme
Court has not yet decided whether litigation activity in the context of one lawsuit, filed with-
out probable cause, is conduct subject to the 'sham exception' ").
58 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983). This amended opin-
ion was issued upon the denial of rehearing and the denial of rehearing en banc. The original
opinion appears at 674 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1982). The amendments are minor and do not
affect this discussion.
59 A freight forwarder ships no goods, but rather "assembles and consolidates small ship-
ments into single lots for shipment by carrier companies." Id. at 1245.
60 RMMTB is a rate bureau formed under the [Interstate Commerce Act]. A
rate bureau is an organization formed by an agreement among common car-
riers. Through the bureau the carriers act collectively to initiate, consider
and establish rates and fares for members of the bureau. When acting in
conformity with an ICC-approved agreement, joint rate setting action is not
subject to the antitrust laws. . . . RMMTB's membership consists of approx-
imately 1,400 motor carriers, and represents approximately 80 percent of the
transcontinental surface transportation market.
Id at 1245-46.
61 ICC rate regulation of freight forwarders such as Clipper is provided in 49
U.S.C. § 1005, recodified as 49 U.S.C. §§ 10762. Under § 1005, a freight for-
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ants lodged protests with the ICC before each proposed rate reduction.6 2
The ICC investigated and found in Clipper's favor in each instance.63
Clipper sued the RMMTB and the various trucking companies for
antitrust violations alleging, inter alia, that the defendants' protests were
shams.64 The district court granted the defendants' third motion for
summary judgment on the ground that the Noerr-Penninglon doctrine im-
munized their activity from antitrust challenge as a matter of law.65
Clipper appealed the granting of summary judgment.
B. Eliminating the Sham Exception-to-the-Exemption
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and, in the
process, reformulated the sham analysis component of the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine.66 First, the Clipper court recognized that although
"[t]he Noerr-Pennington doctrine is . . .based on the first amendment
[right to petition]," 67 sham activity does not warrant first amendment
protection because it is not petitioning.68 The court reasoned that
warder seeking a rate change publishes a new rate. In the absence of a pro-
test, the rate will take effect automatically thirty days later.
Id at 1246.
62 "If there is a protest, the ICC can suspend effectiveness of the rate while investigating
the protest. The ICC also retains power to suspend any new rate sua sponte, but this power is
rarely exercised." Id
63 Id
64 Id at 1246-47 ("Clipper contended that defendants' protests of [Clipper's rate reduc-
tions] were sham protests filed 'for the purpose of directly restricting, lessening, and prohibit-
ing the legitimate competition' of freight forwarders.").
In addition, Clipper asserted that the defendants supplied fraudulent information to the
ICC in violation of the Waler Process doctrine, which extends antitrust liability to those who
commit fraud on a court or agency to gain a competitive edge. See Walker Process Equip.,
Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). Clipper also alleged that the de-
fendant's protests were part of an overall scheme to reduce competition, see United States v.
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963). Clipper, 690 F.2d at 1247.
65 Clipper, 690 F.2d at 1248. In making its ruling, the district court relied on Franchise
Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542
F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
66 In addition, the court held that the Walker Process doctrine, see supra note 64, applies to
nonpatent cases such as the instant case, see Cliper 690 F.2d at 1260 n.3 1. It directed the trial
court to determine "whether the defendants' actions constituted an antitrust violation in that
they perpetrated fraud on an administrative agency, for predatory ends." Id at 1260; see
Note, Antitrust-Walker Process Extended to Fraud in Nonpatent Area-Clipper Exxpress v.
Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982), 1983 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 137.
The court was equally receptive to Clipper's "overall scheme" argument, see supra note
64, stating that "[i]f Clipper can prove that the defendants engaged in activities which vio-
lated the antitrust laws, those violations do not become immune simply because the defend-
ants used legal means. . . to enforce the violations." Clipper, 690 F.2d at 1264. The court,
therefore, remanded the case in order to give Clipper the opportunity to factually establish its
"overall scheme" theory.
67 Clipper, 690 F.2d at 1254-55 (footnote omitted).
68 The sham exception, on the other hand, reflects a judicial recognition that not
all activity that appears as an effort to influence government is actually an
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1305
where an activity implicates no first amendment right, as in a sham pro-
test, Noerr-Pennington immunity does not attach in the first instance.6 9
Thus, instead of using the Califormia Motor Transport Court's exception-to-
the-exemption analysis, 70 the Clipper court examined the defendants' ap-
parent efforts to influence the ICC to determine whether those efforts
were sincere and thus exercises of a first amendment right.
Clipper contended that the defendants had protested Clipper's rate
changes "automatically, without regard to merit or possible success
before the ICC, and therefore without any intent to induce favorable
action by the ICC. ' 71 The defendants stipulated that "they had done
exactly what Clipper alleged in its complaint.172 The court concluded
that based on these statements, a trier of fact could find that the defend-
ants used the administrative process to harass Clipper, not to win a
favorable judgment from the ICC. The court further noted that if the
defendants did not genuinely attempt to influence the ICC, they were
not petitioning; thus, antitrust laws could be applied to the defendants'
activity without infringing on a first amendment right. 73 The Clipper
court therefore reversed the district court's summary judgment order
and remanded the case for trial. 74
exercise of the first amendment right to petition. At times this activity, dis-
guised as petitioning, is simply an effort to interfere directly with a competi-
tor. In that case, the "sham" petitioning activity is not entitled to first
amendment protection, because it ir not an exercise offrst amendment rights.
Id at 1255.
69 "If the activity is not genuine petitioning activity, the antitrust laws are not sus-
pended and continue to prohibit the violating activities. Because application of the antitrust
laws is not suspended, it will prohibit sham activity . Id at 1255.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
71 690 F.2d at 1254.
72 Id at 1250. The defendants made various stipulations for their summary judgment
motion:
For the purposes of this motion, the court may assume the existence of
the conspiracy alleged in Clipper's interrogatory responses. It may further
assume that everything was done that Clipper says was done to further that
conspiracy.
Again, for the purpose of this motion, the court may accept Clipper's
allegations as fact and assume that defendants expressly agreed among them-
selves not to cut rates to divert traffic from one another-or to put it more
bluntly, that they agreed that their rates would be exactly the same. Such an
agreement would be perfectly lawful and immunized from antitrust liability.
This court may assume for purposes of this motion that the object behind
each of the protests was just what Clipper says it was-that the defendants
who filed them were simply trying to eliminate or destroy competition.
Id (quoting without citing defendants' memorandum accompanying their summary judg-
ment motion).
73 See id at 1255; see also supra notes 67-69 and acompanying text.
74 At trial, Clipper still would need to prove that the defendants did not genuinely seek
to influence the ICC before the court would deny the defendants Noerr-Pennington immunity
from antitrust liability. 690 F.2d at 1253-54; see supra note 18.
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C. Reconciling the California Motor Transport Decision with the
Clipper Court's First Amendment Approach
Various lower courts have derived from Justice Douglas's attempt
to define sham activity in California Motor Transport75 one or more "re-
quirements" for a finding of sham activity: (1) a pattern of repetitive
claims 76 (2) that are baseless 77 and (3) that bar access to an agency or
tribunal.7 8 The Clipper court systematically applied its first amendment
analysis to each purported requirement and concluded that none was
required.79
The court first looked to the "theoretical underpinnings" 80 of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and concluded that the doctrine is a judicially
created exception to the antitrust laws that is based on the right to peti-
tion.81 It then reasoned that the "sham exception" simply represents a
judicial recognition that a claim or protest may not be a genuine at-
tempt to influence the government and, consequently, may not be peti-
tioning.82 If an activity is not petitioning, immunity is unnecessary
because prohibiting the activity does not interfere with a constitutional
right. Thus, the court concluded, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not
immunize nonpetitioning activity, regardless of how many claims or
protests make up that activity;83 a single claim may be as unworthy of
-immunity as multiple claims. 84
75 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
76 See, e.g., cases cited in Balmer, supra note 54, at 46 n.33; cases cited in Fischel, supra
note 25, at 108 n.151.
77 See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678, 688 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 231, 104 S. Ct. 259 (1983).
78 See, e.g., Balmer, supra note 54, at 46 & n.32.
79 See 690 F.2d at 1254-59.
80 Id at 1254.
81 The court stated that:
The Noert-Penninglon doctrine is itself a judicially created exception to the ap-
plication of the antitrust laws based on the first amendment. First amend-
ment protection is extended and application, of the antitrust laws suspended
because a legitimate effort to influence government action is part of the guar-
anteed right to petition.
Id at 1254-55 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
82 Id; see supra note 68.
83 The court stated that: "If the activity is not genuine petitioning activity, the antitrust
laws are not suspended. . . . Because application of the antitrust laws is not suspended, it
will prohibit sham activity, whether that activity consists of single or multiple sham suits."
690 F.2d at 1255.
84 The Clipper court conceded that the defendant's institution of multiple suits would
facilitate the plaintiff's task in establishing the lack of a genuine effort to influence the govern-
ment. It went on to point out, however, that in a review of summary judgment, the court is
not concerned with a party's ultimate ability to persuade the factfinder as long as a possibility
exists that he may succeed. Thus, the court concluded that "it is entirely conceivable that the
requisite sham intent can be proven when there is only a single sham suit." Id at 1255 n.22.
Commentators agree with the Clipper court's conclusion. See, e.g., Balmer, supra note 54, at 55-
56; Fischel, supra note 25, at 110.
The Clipper court also relied on the fraud and bribery examples Justice Douglas men-
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The Clipper court then sidestepped the issue of baselessness. It
found the fact that the defendants failed in all their protests sufficient to
establish a triable issue regarding baselessness.8 5 This finding indicates
that the court considers unsuccessful protests evidence of baselessness.
The opinion left unanswered the question of whether baselessness is a
requisite element of nonpetitioning behavior.8 6
The Ch'pper court then addressed the defendants' contention that a
showing of access barring is required to establish the existence of sham
activity. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States,87 the court rejected the defendants' contention.18 The
Ninth Circuit correctly read Otter Tail as indicating that " 'access bar-
ring' refers only to one type of abuse ofjudicial or administrative process
and that 'access barring' need not be present for the maintenance of a
suit under the sham exception."8 9 Thus, the Cliper court concluded
that a plaintiff need not show that the defendant's activity denied him
access to a judicial or administrative tribunal to prove that the activity
tioned in Califomia7 Motor Tramp., 404 U.S. at 512-13, (both examples involved only a single
act), to illustrate abuses of the judicial and administrative processes that are also antitrust
violations. 690 F.2d at 1255-56. Finally, the Clipper court refused to read Vendo Co. v. Lek-
tro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) as requiring multiple suits. 690 F.2d at 1256 n.24.
85 See 690 F.2d at 1257.
86 The court's reasoning would have been more consistent if it had concluded that base-
lessness was not required but rather was evidence of a sham. The court's general holding was
that nonpetitioning activity, that is, activity that does not seek to influence governmental
decisionmaking, does not deserve Noerr-Pennington immunity. Specifically, the court found that
multiple suits, see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text, and access barring, see infia notes
87-90 and accompanying text, are not requirements for a finding of sham activity but may be
used as evidence that a defendant did not genuinely seek to influence governmental decision-
making. Baselessness may be treated similarly. The fact that a defendant filed baseless suits
or protests supports the contention that he did not intend to win and therefore did not seek to
influence governmental decisionmaking. See Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830,
841 (9th Cir. 1980) (unsuccessful suits imply less than genuine effort).
Furthermore, baseless protests, even if genuine, have little first amendment value.
Therefore, such protests may be restricted if they sufficiently threaten an important govern-
mental interest. See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. The Clipper court, however,
failed to recognize this argument.
87 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
88 See Clipper, 690 F.2d at 1257-59. The Cbper court also relied on Lafayette v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,
439 U.S. 96 (1978), and Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) to support this
conclusion. 690 F.2d at 1257 n.26.
89 690 F.2d at 1257 (footnote omitted).
The defendants attempted to distinguish Otter Tail on the ground that the petitioning
activity in that case was directed toward the courts rather than toward an administrative
body, as in Clipper. The Clipper court correctly found no distinction, reasoning that "[t]he
same dangers that the antitrust laws seek to prohibit flow from instituting sham administra-
tive proceedings as flow from instituting sham judicial proceedings." Id. at 1258. The many
differences between the administrative and the judicial process are unimportant in discussing
Noerr-Pennington immunity. Such a discussion focuses on the genuineness of a party's effort to
influence a governmental body-the particular characteristics of the governmental body in-
volved are immaterial.
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is unworthy of Noerr-Pennington immunity.90
D. Effects of Clipper: Ease of Stating a Claim, Reduction of
Predatory Litigation, and Possible Chilling Effect
The Clipper court's rejection of the requirements other courts have
imposed on plaintiffs seeking to prosecute a suit under the sham excep-
tion, proof of access barring and the defendant's institution of repetitive,
baseless claims, makes it easier for a plaintiff to state a claim for an
antitrust violation and survive a defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion.9 1 A plaintiff can more easily show, for the purposes of summary
judgment,92 that the defendant's goal in filing a claim or protest was not
to secure a favorable outcome in the proceedings, thereby establishing
that the defendant was not petitioning and does not deserve Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity. For example, an allegation that a defendant brought
a single unsuccessful suit without regard to merit would be sufficient for
a plaintiff to state a claim and survive a motion for summary
judgment. 93
90 See id at 1259 ("we conclude that to invoke the sham exception, some abuse of pro-
cess, although not necessarily access barring, must be alleged").
The Clipper court failed to recognize the argument that access barring, like baseless
claims, has little first amendment value. Restricting access barring may be constitutionally
justified even if it cannot be shown to be sham activity. See infra notes 122-30 and accompa-
nying text.
91 Most decisions in this area involve appellate review of summary judgment rulings.
See, e.g., Clipper, 690 F.2d 1240. In this posture, courts view the pleadings in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See id at 1250. These decisions are not helpful in deter-
mining the amount of evidence a court will deem sufficient to establish a defendant's lack of
genuine effort. Courts may develop various presumptions and burden-shifting devices as
more cases are tried and then reviewed on the basis of sufficiency of evidence. For example,
the burden of persuasion may shift to the defendant if the plaintiff produces evidence of
repeated, unsuccessful suits. Because the defendant is in a better position to prove his sincer-
ity, shifting the burden to him is logical. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425
U.S. 738, 746 (1976), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 231, 104 S.Ct. 259 (1983). No such devices have yet
replaced a case-by-case approach, in which the trier of facts decides the ultimate question of
genuineness.
92 Compare Clipper, 690 F.2d at 1250 (standard of review of summary judgment motion),
with Mark Aero, Inc. v. TWA, 580 F.2d 288, 296 (8th Cir. 1978) (standard of review of motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
93 But see Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff
must allege specific facts to demonstrate sham); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San
Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 1976)
(plaintiff's complaint must allege means by which defendant planned to bar access), cert. de-
nied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
At trial, however, a plaintiff must establish factually that the defendant did not intend to
influence governmental decisionmaking. See supra note 18. The proceedings would take the
following course. Plaintiff brings an antitrust action against defendant alleging that defend-
ant engaged in behavior that had, or was designed to have, an anticompetitive effect. De-
fendant argues that he genuinely sought to influence governmental decisionmaking and,
therefore, should be awarded Noerr-Pennington immunity. Plaintiff then carries the burden of
persuading the trier of fact that defendant's motive was not what defendant represented it to
be. See Energy Conservation, Inc. v. Heliodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1983). Plain-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1305
Because Ch'bper makes it easier for plaintiffs like Clipper Exxpress to
bring antitrust actions against competitors and survive summary judg-
ment motions, 94 competitors will be more reluctant to use the judicial
and administrative processes to harass each other. Predatory litigation
not only places burdens on the judicial and administrative bodies in-
volved, but also helps to perpetuate monopolies.95 Thus, by facilitating
the means by which a harassed competitor can obtain redress, Cioper
has neutralized an anticompetitive device and furthered the objective of
antitrust legislation.
Unfortunately, Clipper also may have a chilling effect on competi-
tors' prosecution of good faith claims against their rivals;96 although a
party may bring an action genuinely seeking to win, it faces the possibil-
ity of having to defend an antitrust action if it loses. 97 A litigant who
claims to have been the victim of a competitor's sham suits need only
allege that the competitor did not genuinely seek to influence govern-
mental decisionmaking and produce evidence of the competitor's unsuc-
cessful suits.98 Using the Clipper analysis, a court would deny the
tiff may sustain his burden by bringing forth evidence of access barring, lack of probable
cause, and repetitive, baseless suits. See Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358,
1372 n.46 (5th Cir. 1983). A court may encounter difficulty in determining defendant's true
purpose for initiating the litigation; but, as Judge Posner states, "no more. . . than in many
other areas of antitrust law." Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472
(7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2430 (1983).
Furthermore, the Clipper approach requires courts to apply a lower level of proof to es-
tablish a sham. Under the exception-to-the-exemption analysis, a court automatically awards
a defendant Noerr-Pennington immunity when it files a claim or protest. See Coastal States
Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1367 (5th Cir. 1983). In this posture, a plaintiff appears
to be trying to take a pre-existing right away from the defendant. Under Clipper, a plaintiff
can show that defendant's protests or claims do not deserve Noerr-Pennington immunity in the
first place by showing that they were not genuine attempts to influence governmental
decisionmaking.
94 This result is consistent with the rigorous standard of review applied to dismissals of
antitrust claims. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 231, 104 S. Ct. 259 (1983). But see Energy Conservation, Inc. v. He-
liodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Courts may properly be more critical in
reviewing complaints which invoke the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine since
the conduct is presumptively protected by the first amendment .... "); Balmer, supra note
54, at 61.
95 See Balmer, supra note 54, at 63; Kaler, The Sham Exception to the Noerr-Pennington
Antitrust Immunity: Its Potentialfor Mininizing Anticompetitive Abuse of the Administrative Regulatogy
Process, 12 TOLEDO L. REv. 63, 76 (1980).
96 The Ninth Circuit recognized this danger in Franchise Realty, 542 F.2d at 1082. The
court required that a complaint allege "specific activities" so as not to endanger first amend-
ment guarantees.
97 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
faced a counterclaim for alleged antitrust violations even though district court granted sum-
mary judgment on plaintiff's original claim and plaintiff had prevailed in similar suits with
other parties).
98 In the alternative, a plaintiff could present evidence that the defendant's actions
barred entry to a market. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973)
(defendant's pending suits prevented the approval of bonds necessary for plaintiffs to enter
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competitor's motion for summary judgment,99 and the case would then
proceed to the costly discovery phase. This scenario could discourage
the competitor from bringing legitimate claims in the first instance and
thus from exercising its right of petition.
III
DISCUSSION
The Cli.per court's refusal to recognize a repeated claims require-
ment' 00 or an access barring requirement,' 0 ' and its discussion regard-
ing a baselessness requirement 0 2 evidence its well-reasoned analysis of
an issue that has confused courts since California Motor Transport. ' 0 3 Be-
cause it rejected the exception-to-the-exemption approach,1 0 4 the Ninth
Circuit was free to use the first amendment foundation of Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity to transform a confusing analysis that relied on artifi-
cial requirements into a consistent theory of antitrust liability in cases
where alleged petitioning of adjudicative tribunals restrains trade. Ac-
cording to the Ninth Circuit's theory, antitrust liability applies to all
activity that is not protected by the first amendment right to petition. 10 5
The right to petition protects all genuine attempts to influence govern-
mental decisionmaking except in certain instances where the govern-
ment may constitutionally regulate the petitioning activity. 10 6
Consequently, a plaintiff bringing an antitrust action against a defend-
ant who appears to have been petitioning may establish that Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity does not apply to the defendant's activity by: (1)
showing that the defendant's activity was not, in fact, petitioning, that
is, it was not a genuine effort to influence governmental decisionmak-
ing;10 7 or (2) showing that, under traditional first amendment analysis,
the petitioning activity sufficiently threatens a government interest to
market); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 841 (9th Cir. 1980) (litigation pre-
vented plaintiff from entering market); see also Litton Syss., Inc. v AT&T, 700 F.2d 785 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984).
99 Clipper, 690 F.2d at 1253-54. But see Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643,
651 (7th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must do more than merely allege that defendant's conduct was a
sham).
100 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
104 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
105 See Clipper, 690 F.2d at 1255 ("If the activity is not genuine petitioning activity, the
antitrust laws are not suspended and continue to prohibit the violating activities.").
106 In selected instances, the Supreme Court has allowed the government to compromise
first amendment activity. See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (religion); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (press); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508 (1972) (petitioning); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (speech);
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (commercial speech).
107 See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
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justify restricting that activity. 108
A. Analyzing Apparent Petitioning to Determine Whether It
Merits Noerr-Pennington Immunity
1. Sham Activity Remains Subject to Antitrust Liabiity." The Clipper
Court's Approach
The Noerr Court stated that ostensible petitioning activity that is, in
fact, a "mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an at-
tempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competi-
tor" 10 9 will remain subject to antitrust laws. In the first case to find an
example of such sham activity, the California Motor Transport Court wrote
a poor opinion that left lower courts confused as to how to define sham
behavior.1 10 In Ch'bper, the Ninth Circuit resolved much of this confu-
sion for cases involving alleged petitioning in the adjudicative context.
According to the C1ipper court, Noerr-Pennington immunity is based
on petitioning rights, which exist if a party genuinely seeks to influence
governmental decisionmaking."1 1 Thus, in the adjudicative context, a
party bringing an action must genuinely intend to win in order to re-
ceive Noerr-Pennington immunity. 1 12 Courts need only look to evidence of
the party's sincerity in bringing the claim 113 rather than proceeding
through the exception-to-the-exemption analysis. The advantage of the
Ninth Circuit's approach is that it provides clear guidelines to trial
courts based on traditional first amendment analysis.1 14 Such guidelines
108 See infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
109 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
110 See Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1371 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The
Supreme Court has never defined with precision the standard for determining when litigation
is a sham."); see also supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
111 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
112 See Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982) ("liti-
gation is actionable under the antitrust laws. . . . when [defendant's] purpose is not to win a
favorable judgment against a competitor"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2430 (1983); ef Coastal
States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1372 (5th Cir. 1983) (requiring that "a genuine
desire for judicial relief [be] a significant motivating factor underlying the suit" for immunity
to be granted).
For an application of the Clipper court's first amendment approach to other forms of
petitioning, see infra notes 132-39, 149-64 and accompanying text.
113 See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379 n.9 (1973) (fact that
defendant knew its pending suits prevented issuance of bonds necessary for plaintiff to enter
market was evidence that defendant did not seek to influence governmental decisionmaking);
Litton Syss., Inc. v. AT&T, 700 F.2d 785, 811 (2d Cir. 1983) (filing suits with "no realistic
hope" of success is evidence of sham), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 984 (1984).
Unlike the exception-to-the-exemption approach, the Clipper approach does not contain
specific evidentiary requirements. The factfinder simply determines if defendant genuinely
sought to win on the basis of all relevant evidence.
114 The Clipper test is not simply an abuse of process or malicious prosecution test. See
Kaler, supra note 95, at 82. But see Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immuni for Concerted Attempts to
Influence Courts and Adudicatov, Agencies. Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86
HARV. L. REV. 715, 715-16 (1973) (arguing that "the underlying policies and substantive
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should produce a consistent body of case law that safeguards first
amendment rights.
A simple example may best illustrate the desirability of the Clipper
court's approach."15 Suppose A plans to build a shopping center but the
proposed location must be rezoned before the project can proceed. B,
the owner of a nearby shopping center, files protests with the zoning
board in an attempt to delay construction of A -s shopping center. A suc-
cessfully defends against each of B's protests but the struggle exhausts
A s financial resources. As a result, A is forced to abandon the project.
A then brings an antitrust action against B alleging that Bs protests
restrained trade.
Under the exception-to-the-exemption approach, a court would au-
tomatically exempt B from the antitrust laws under Noerr-Penninglon.1' 6
A would then bear the burden of producing evidence that B's activity
rules of these torts could profitably be employed in the antitrust context in determining when
concerted conduct by participants in court and agency proceedings is unlawful").
The tort of abuse of process requires that the defendant commit a specific tortious act
outside the administrative or judicial proceedings. The Clipper court's first amendment test,
on the other hand, applies regardless of whether the defendant committed any extraneous
acts. The fundamental distinction is that the abuse of process tort is designed to catch those
who legitimately use the legal process for illegitimate purposes. See Kaler, supra note 95, at 82.
The purposes of using the legal process do not matter under Clipper, they may be anticompeti-
tive or otherwise illegitimate. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670. The Clipper approach focuses on
the question of whether defendant's activities are legitimate efforts to influence governmental
decisionmaking.
Activity may be an abuse of process yet be immune from the antitrust laws under Noerr-
Pennington. For example, if one party files suit genuinely seeking to prevail on the merits but
uses the suit to extort concessions from its competitor, that party may receive Noerr-Penninglon
immunity but may be liable to its competitor for abuse of process. Some courts have errone-
ously interpreted Noerr and its progeny to hold that the test for abuse of process is identical to
the test for sham activity. See, e.g., Ad Visor, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 640 F.2d 1107,
1109 (9th Cir. 1981) ("the 'sham' exception. . . test. . . can be characterized as an abuse of
process" test).
Malicious prosecution and similar violations in administrative proceedings require a
higher level of proof than does the Clipper test. Cf Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702
F.2d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 1983) (distinguishing between malice and sham); Grip-Pak, Inc. v.
Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 476 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the proposition that a
nonmalicious lawsuit can never violate antitrust law), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2430 (1983). The
action must terminate in favor of the victim before he can state a claim for relief under
malicious prosecution. W. PROSSER, THE Law OF TORTS § 119, at 838 (4th ed. 1971). The
Clipper approach contains no such requirement. In addition, malicious prosecution requires a
finding that the defendant lacked probable cause for his suit, W. PROSSER, supra, at 841,
while the Clipper approach requires only a finding that the goal of the action be other than
seeking redress. See also Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1176 (10th
Cir. 1982) (a "'sham' is something more than a mere 'absence of probable cause' "). Under
Clipper a party may have probable cause but still not earn Noerr-Pennington immunity because
he initiated his suit as a pretext for achieving some collateral objective.
115 This hypothetical case is derived from Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664
F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1981).
116 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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fits into the California Motor Transport Court's sham exception.' 17 In con-
trast, a court applying the Cliper approach would examine Bs underly-
ing objective in filing its protests with the zoning board. If A could show
that B filed the protests not in a genuine effort to influence the zoning
board but merely to harass and delay A,118 then Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity would not apply because filing the sham protests is not petitioning
activity protected by the first amendment.
A survey of cases decided after Clipper indicates that the Ninth Cir-
cuit's treatment of the sham claim issue has met with approval. Some
courts have adopted the Clapper court's approach with limited modifica-
tions. 1 19 Others have followed the spirit of the Ninth Circuit's analysis
without citing Clipper.120 The trend is to replace the exception-to-the-
exemption approach with the Clapper court's first amendment
117 For example, A would have to show that BSr protests barred A's access to the zoning
board, or that the protests were baseless and repetitive.
118 A showing of harassment or desire to delay is neither necessary nor sufficient to estab-
lish the sham character of Bs protests. These are just examples of evidence that would tend
to show that Bs objective was not to influence the zoning board.
119 For example, the Fifth Circuit followed the Clipper decision in Coastal States Mktg.,
Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983). The plaintiff in Hunt alleged that the defendant's
"well-publicized threat to litigate wherever and whenever necessary" had an anticompetitive
effect and was not immunized petitioning. Id at 1367. After citing Clipper, Judge Rubin
stated that "[a] litigant should enjoy petitioning immunity from the antitrust laws so long as a
genuine desire for judicial relief is a significant motivating factor underlying the suit." Id at
1372.
The Ninth Circuit followed the Clipper approach in Energy Conservation, Inc. v. He-
liodyne, Inc., 698 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1983). In Heliodyne, a corporation sued its competitor and
its competitor's law firm, alleging that they conspired to bring a sham lawsuit. The district
court dismissed the action at least partially on the ground that a single suit cannot constitute
a sham. Id at 388. In reversing the district court, the Heliodyne court followed the Clipper
approach closely, reiterating that the factfinder must determine whether the claim is a genu-
ine attempt to influence governmental action. Id at 389.
120 For example, the Second Circuit applied the Clipper approach in Litton Syss. Inc. v.
AT&T, 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 984 (1984). The defendant, AT&T,
had filed tariffs with the ICC that required customers to purchase an additional piece of
AT&T equipment to hook up Litton's device to the phone lines. Litton alleged that AT&T
filed these tariffs to buy time until AT&T could develop its own device. Id at 801. The court
held that AT&T's tariffs were shams because they were filed with no realistic hope of success.
Id at 811. Although the Litton court only cited the Cliper court's holding that "a single claim
can be a sham," id at 811 n.38, it clearly applied the Clipper approach, basing the application
of Noerr-Pennington immunity on the genuineness of the actor's efforts to seek favorable action
before the ICC.
The Seventh Circuit took an approach very similar to that used by the Clipper court in
Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
2430 (1983), although it did not specifically rely on Clipper. The defendant in Grip-Pak had
filed lawsuits against the plaintiff in an effort to prevent the plaintiff's entry into the six-pack
holder manufacturing market. 694 F.2d at 468. In an opinion that never mentions "sham
exception," Judge Posner analyzed the defendant's purpose in filing the suits to determine
whether it was entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity. The judge reasoned that "[t]he line
[determining antitrust liability] is crossed when [the defendant's] purpose is not to win a
favorable judgment against a competitor but to harass him, and deter others, by the process
itself-regardless of outcome-of litigating." Id at 472.
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analysis. 121
2. Petitioning Activity Remains Subject to Antitrust Liability if the
Government May Constitutional Restrict the Activity
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is grounded in the first amendment
right to petition.' 22 Activity protected by the right to petition merits
Noerr-Pennington immunity from antitrust laws. Thus, Noerr-Pennington
analysis derives directly from petitioning rights analysis. The Supreme
Court has never drawn a clear distinction between the right to petition
and other first amendment rights. Rather, the Court has regarded these
rights as an inseparable collection of cognate rights. 123 An analysis of
the right to petition for purposes of evaluating the applicability of Noerr-
Pennington immunity therefore mirrors the analysis of other first amend-
ment rights such as free speech and free expression. 124
Under traditional first amendment analysis, the Court has inter-
preted the Constitution to allow the government to restrict the content
of behavior that poses a "clear and present danger" to a sufficiently im-
portant governmental interest. 125 It follows that a statutory construc-
tion of the Sherman Act 26 that results in a content-based restriction 2 7
121 Not all courts have completely freed themselves from the exception-to-the-exemption
trap. Notwithstanding its decision in Grip-Pak, see supra note 120, the Seventh Circuit in
Havoco of Am., Ltd. v. Hollobow, 702 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1983), affirmed the district court's
decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants and adopted the district court's con-
clusion that the sham exception does not apply because "unlike. . . California Motor Transport
.... there is no pattern of baseless, repetitive claims." Id at 650.
122 See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138 (basing immunity on statutory construction of the Sherman
Act as protective of petitioning rights); Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Deal-
ers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D. Del. 1980) ("the scope of the Norr exemption is properly
defined by reference to the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment"); Fischel,
supra note 25, at 100. But see Suburban Restoration Co. v. Acmat Corp., 700 F.2d 98, 101 (2d
Cir. 1983) (expressly refusing to base decision on first amendment grounds).
123 In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), the Supreme Court stated:
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and
press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peace-
ably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though
not identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights. . . and therefore are
united in the First Article's assurance.
Id at 530.
124 See Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553,
557-58 (D. Del. 1980) (applying free speech jurisprudence to question of Noerr-Penningon im-
munity); Fisehel, supra note 25, at 100-04 (reasoning that "the values promoted by the first
amendment free speech guaranty and those advanced by the Noerr doctrine are very similar").
125 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308-09 (1981) (disclosure of national security and
intelligence operations information not protected). For an important application of the
"clear and present danger" test, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (invalidating
Ohio statute that punishes mere advocacy and assembly because statute failed to draw dis-
tinction between inciting or producing imminent lawless action and mere abstract teaching).
126 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
127 Returning to the shopping center hypothetical discussed above, see supra notes 115-19
and accompanying text, a construction of the Sherman Act that denies Noerr-Pennington im-
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on petitioning activity is unjustified without a showing that the petition-
ing activity circumscribed poses a clear and present danger to the gov-
ernment's interest in maintaining free competition. A content-neutral
restriction, on the other hand, 128 must satisfy the balancing test set forth
in United States v. O'Brien.129 The O'Brien test requires that the govern-
mental interest in regulating the circumscribed conduct be sufficiently
important to outweigh any incidental limitation on a first amendment
freedom. If either of these tests justifies governmental restriction of first
amendment rights, then Noerr-Pennington immunity from antitrust laws
must be denied even if the defendant was genuinely seeking to influence
governmental decisionmaking. 130
B. Applying a Consistent Noerr-Pennington Analysis to Lobbying,
Lawsuits, and Political Boycotts
Petitioning may take many forms, ranging from a simple letter to a
congressman to a terrorist kidnapping. Courts applying the Noerr-Pen-
nington analysis have focused on three categories of petitioning: legisla-
tive lobbying, lawsuits or protests before an administrative-adjudicative
tribunal, and political boycotts. Courts have taken seemingly different
approaches to the issue of Noerr-Pennington immunity in each of these
three areas. 131 Upon closer examination, the decisions and opinions in
some important cases in each area may be reconciled by reference to a
single theory of Noerr-Pennington immunity-all genuine attempts to in-
munity to Bs protests simply because of their anticompetitive nature would constitute a con-
tent-based restriction.
128 An interpretation of the Sherman Act that denies immunity to all protests before
zoning boards would constitute a content-neutral restriction.
129 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the defendant burned his draft card to symbolize his
opposition to the Vietnam War. He contended that the federal statute that prohibited de-
struction or mutilation of draft cards was unconstitutional because it violated his first amend-
ment right to free speech. The Court applied a four-part balancing test in concluding that
the defendant's activity was not protected by the first amendment:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [I] if it is within the consti-
tutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id at 377.
130 This conclusion is inescapable when one considers first amendment cases involving
behavior such as a terrorist kidnapping or the bribery of a public official. If this activity is
undertaken with a genuine desire to influence governmental decisionmaking, then it is bona
fide petitioning activity. However, it would be ludicrous to assume that such behavior merits
protection under the first amendment given the government's overriding interest in restricting
such behavior.
Cf 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 15, 205 (arguing that "[n]ot every incident
of lawful political activity should be immune from antitrust law").
131 Furthermore, courts have taken different approaches to cases within the same cate-
gory of petitioning. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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fluence governmental decisionmaking shall be immune from antitrust
liability if there is no constitutionally justifiable governmental restric-
tion of the activity.
1. Lobbying as Petitioning Activity
In Noerr, the defendants engaged in lobbying,1 32 which, in and of
itself, was not anticompetitive. Only through legislation "could [the
publicity campaign] have had the effect of damaging the competitive
position" of the plaintiffs.133 To find that the defendants' activity was
subject to antitrust liability, the Noerr Court would therefore have had
to construe the Sherman Act to prohibit petitioning that ultimately is
designed to reduce competition. Such an interpretation would have cre-
ated a content-based statutory restriction that infringes upon the right
to petition.134
In testing the constitutionality of a content-based statutory restric-
tion on the right to petition, a court must determine whether the activ-
ity poses a "clear and present danger" to a significant governmental
interest.1 35 In the antitrust context, the governmental interest at stake is
free competition.' 36 Given the stiff requirements of the "clear and pres-
ent danger" test, 137 the Noerr defendants' activity would not have suffi-
ciently threatened free competition to warrant suppression of their first
amendment rights. Therefore, the Noerr Court properly awarded immu-
nity to the defendants' petitioning because no justification for govern-
mental restriction'of the petitioning existed.' 38
132 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140 ("the railroads' campaign was directed toward obtaining gov-
ernmental action"). The defendant in Noear also employed a "third party technique," which
"was aptly characterized by the District Court as involving 'deception of the public'" and
which "depends upon giving propaganda actually circulated by a party in interest the ap-
pearance of being spontaneous declarations of independent groups." Id at 140. The Court,
however, did not consider this practice to be distinguishable from the defendant's other peti-
tioning activities under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. See id at 140-42; see also Missouri v.
National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1314 (8th Cir.) (third party technique is mere tool
to influence governmental decisionmaking), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). But see Franchise
Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542
F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1976) (interpreting Noerr to extend immunity to publicity cam-
paigns only), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977).
133 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139 n.18.
134 Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n, 499 F. Supp. 553, 557
(D. Del. 1980).
135 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
136 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
137 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-71, 276 (1981) (holding that state univer-
sity's policy of excluding religious groups from participating in the same open forum as other
student groups was an invalid content-based restriction of first amendment activity, stating
"[we] have required the most exacting scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regu-
late speech on the basis of its content"); see alsoJ. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. NELSON, HAND-
BOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 740 (1978) (arguing that the Court should apply the "clear
and present danger" test in a strict manner).
138 The Noerr Court failed to articulate this analysis beyond stating that "[an opposite]
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The sham issue does not often require much attention in lobbying
cases. The competitive advantage lobbyists seek would accrue from the
passage of the legislation for which they are lobbying, not from the lob-
bying activity itself. Thus, lobbying activity will rarely be an insincere
effort to influence governmental decisions.' 3 9
2. Adjudication as Petitioning Activity
In an adjudicative setting,140 the sham issue requires greater atten-
tion.141 The mere filing of a suit or lodging of a protest often may harm
a competitor. 142 Thus, a court must determine whether a party genu-
inely attempted to influence governmental decisionmaking in initiating
its action before awarding the party Noerr-Pennington immunity. In this
context, a party does not genuinely attempt to influence governmental
decisionmaking when he does not seek to win the confrontation. 143
Even in the adjudicative context, petitioning may be regulated
under traditional first amendment analysis if there is a constitutionally
justifiable governmental restriction of the activity. For example, restric-
tions on access barring suits may be constitutionally acceptable despite
the fact that the suits are petitioning. Thus, if an enterprise controlled a
significant portion of the market, but its grip was so tenuous that it be-
lieved it could only maintain its market share by filing suit against any
and all those seeking to enter the market, a court would not find the
construction of the Sherman Act would raise important constitutional questions," Aotrr, 365
U.S. at 137-38, because Noerr predated the Brandenberg "clear and present danger" test by nine
years.
The Pennington Court's decision also is consistent with this analysis. An interpretation of
the Sherman Act that would have prohibited the defendants' activity would have been con-
tent-based; it would have prevented the UMW and large coal operators from jointly ap-
proaching the Secretary of Labor just because they sought an anticompetitive mandate from
that official. See 381 U.S. at 669-70. As in Noer, this activity does not sufficiently threaten
free competition to satisfy the "clear and present danger" test. See supra note 125. Thus, no
justified governmental restriction of this activity exists.
139 See Mark Aero, Inc. v. TWA, 580 F.2d 288, 297 (8th Cir. 1978) ("Normally, in a
nonadjudicative setting, such as the legislative arena, [the sham issue] presents no particular
problem."). The Norm Court briefly addressed this issue, warning that sham lobbying would
exist if the defendant's activity was "nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor," but concluded that "this certainly is not the case
here."
The Pennington Court found discussion of the sham issue unnecessary, probably because it
was factually established that the UMW and the large operators genuinely sought to convince
the Secretary of Labor to set a higher minimum wage. See 381 U.S. at 656.
140 The following discussion applies to administrative adjudicative processes as well as
judicial processes. See supra note 89.
141 See Mark Aero, Inc. v. TWA, 580 F.2d 288, 297 (8th Cir. 1978) ("in the adjudicative
setting the question [of sham activity] can become more complex").
142 E.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973) (plaintiff could
not sell bonds while litigation was pending); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830,
835-36 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).
143 See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
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suits to be shams if the enterprise genuinely sought to win them. The
enterprise's litigation activity may be subject to antitrust liability if the
resultant incidental restriction on the enterprise's right to petition is jus-
tified under the O'Brien balancing test.144
A construction of the Sherman Act that prohibits access barring
suits would be content-neutral because it would prohibit all claims that
barred access regardless of the content of those claims. Thus, one must
apply the O'Brien balancing test to determine whether the restriction is
constitutionally permissible. First, the Sherman Act is within the consti-
tutional power of the government. 145 Second, the protection of free com-
petition is an important governmental interest. 146 Third, interpreting
the Sherman Act to prohibit this activity would result in only incidental
infringement of a first amendment right. Finally, the restriction on peti-
tioning is no greater than necessary for the furtherance of free competi-
tion.147 On balance, a prohibition on access barring suits would be
constitutionally acceptable despite the incidental effect such a prohibi-
tion would have on the litigant's right to petition.148
144 See supra note 129. An interpretation of the Sherman Act restricting such access bar-
ring conduct would be content-neutral because it would prohibit all incidents of multiple
suits that delay a competitor's entry into the market, regardless of the goal behind the suits.
Another possible approach would be to determine whether a party would have brought
suit against a potential competitor even if the suit could not prevent or delay entry into his
market. See Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1371-72 (5th Cir. 1983). Such
an approach, however, would involve the court in a business judgment analysis and is there-
fore less desirable than the approach suggested above.
In contrast to restrictions on all access barring suits regardless of their purpose, an inter-
pretation of the Sherman Act that would prohibit a single suit brought for an anticompetitive
purpose, see Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1256-58 (9th Cir. 1982), would
be a content-based restriction of the right to petition because the restriction would be based
on the goal of the suit. The "clear and present danger" test therefore would be applicable.
See supra note 125. It is extremely unlikely that a single lawsuit will sufficiently threaten free
competition for the "clear and present danger" test to justify a content-based restriction of the
activity. Cf. supra note 130.
145 See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-
35 (1948) (Congress may promote competition under its commerce power).
146 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are
as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the
Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.").
147 The California Motor Tramp. Court intimated this when it based its reversal of sum-
mary judgment in part on the allegations that the result of defendants' suits:
was that the machinery of the agencies and the courts was effectively closed to
[the plaintiffs], and [the defendants] indeed became "the regulators of the
grants of rights, transfers and registrations" to [the plaintiffs]-thereby de-
pleting and diminishing the value of the business of [the plaintiffs] and ag-
grandizing [the defendants'] economic and monopoly power.
404 U.S. at 511.
148 The California Motor Transp. Court implicitly endorsed this analysis, stating that access
barring suits could be restricted even if such activity was "part of the right of petition pro-
tected by the First Amendment." 404 U.S. at 513. Although the Court's treatment of this
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3. Political Boycotts as Petitioning Activity
Political boycotts are refusals to buy, sell, or deal with a person,
organization, or with groups of organizations in an effort to coerce legis-
lators or policymakers to pass certain laws or set certain policies. t49 On
their face, these boycotts involve efforts to influence governmental deci-
sionmaking. 150 They also are "combination [s] . . . in restraint of
trade"' 5'1 and consequently fall within the express prohibitions of the
Sherman Act.' 52 Therefore, a court must decide if the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine immunizes political boycotts from antitrust challenges. 153
A political boycott will rarely be found to be a sham. The sponsors
of and participants in a group boycott sacrifice the option to buy or sell
certain goods or services to put political pressure on legislators.' 54 Thus,
unless a plaintiff can show that a defendant initiated the boycott solely
to harass a competitor and not to effect a change in laws or governmen-
issue was not thorough, its conclusion is consistent with traditional first amendment analysis.
See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
Professors Areeda and Turner advocate use of a similar approach. See I P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 15, 205. They assert that a court should consider "(i) the severity of the
danger to competition, (ii) the obviousness of a less dangerous alternative, and (iii) the cus-
tomary political character of the challenged behavior." Id Because access barring lawsuits
"are not customary forms of political expression and are very dangerous to competition," id.,
Areeda and Turner would reach the same result as that derived from application of the
O'Brien test in cases involving restrictions on access barring litigation.
149 See, e.g., Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1302 (8th Cir.) (boy-
cott of Missouri convention halls in attempt to coerce Missouri legislators to ratify Equal
Rights Amendment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
Participants in commercial boycotts, on the other hand, seek to coerce a private individ-
ual or private organization into taking some desired action. See, e.g., Fashion Originators'
Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461-62 (1941) (combination of manufacturers of
original women's garments and manufacturers of textiles used for those garments refused to
deal with retailers who sold copies of original garments in an effort to induce retailers not to
market copies).
150 Political boycotts could be categorized as a type of lobbying. See supra notes 132-39
and accompanying text. But because they are solely an economic form of coercion, and the
antitrust laws are designed to control certain economic behavior, political boycotts deserve
independent analysis.
151 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
152 The Supreme Court has held that group boycotts are per se illegal. See Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,347-49 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359
U.S. 207, 210-12 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68
(1941).
153 The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate that a constitutional analysis of antitrust
immunity can be, and has been, applied to all forms of petitioning, including political boy-
cotts. For more thorough analyses of the constitutional aspects of boycotting activity, see
Kennedy, supra note 17; Note, NOW or Never: Is There Antitrust Liability for Noncommercial Boy-
cotts?, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, NO Wor Never]; Note, Com-
mercial Entities and Political Boycotts. First Amendment Protection versus Sherman Act Prohibition 14
CONN. L. REV. 391 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Commercial Entities]; Note, Political Boycott
Activity and The First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 659 (1978); Comment, Protest Boycotts Under
the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131 (1980).
154 E.g., Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 629 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.) (plaintiffs sacri-
ficed ability to hold conventions in Missouri), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
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tal policies, a court will find that the defendant is engaging in petition-
ing activity because it is genuinely attempting to influence
governmental decisionmaking.1 55
Determining whether petitioning activity in the form of political
boycotts may constitutionally be restricted is a more difficult problem.
Because an interpretation of the Sherman Act prohibiting all political
boycotts would be content-neutral, 156 a court would apply the O'Brien
balancing test to determine if the governmental interest in regulating
political boycotts is sufficiently important to justify the incidental limi-
tation on the right to petition.
The Delaware District Court applied this analysis in Osborn v. Penn-
ylvania-Delaware Service Station Dealers Association.'5 7 In Osborn, an organi-
zation of Delaware service stations planned and executed a boycott of
gas sales to the public to express their dissatisfaction with the gas ceiling
price established by the Department of Energy.158 The court concluded
that "[i]f a boycott designed to influence governmental action has pro-
duced an anti-competitive effect of the kind [the antitrust acts] were
intended to guard against, . . . relief can ordinarily be granted with
little threat to First Amendment values."' 15 9
The Supreme Court expressed an analogous view in International
155 This analysis is analogous to the sham analysis of lobbying activity, by which sham
lobbying will be found only where there is no "genuine effort to influence legislation." Noerr,
365 U.S. at 144; see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
156 That is, such an interpretation would prohibit all political boycotts regardless of the
content of those boycotts. See Osborn v. Pennsylvania-Delaware Serv. Station Dealers Ass'n,
499 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D. Del. 1980). But see Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1012 (arguing that
per se illegality of political boycotts fails fourth prong of O'Brien test ).
157 499 F. Supp. 553, 557-58 (D. Del. 1980).
158 Id at 555.
159 Id at 558. For a criticism of the Osborn decision, see Note, Commercial Entities, supra
note 153.
A Pennsylvania district court reached an opposite conclusion and awarded Noerr-Pen-
ninglon immunity in a case involving a similar factual situation. See. Crown Cent. Petroleum
Corp. v. Waldman, 486 F. Supp. 759 (M.D. Pa.), reo'd on proceduralgrounds, 634 F.2d 127 (3d
Cir. 1980). The Waldman court applied the O'Brien test and apparently found that the second
and fourth requirements of that test were not met. See id at 768. After the judgment was
reversed, the district court decided it on other grounds. See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v.
Waldman, 515 F. Supp. 477 (M.D. Pa. 1981). The district court noted that its antitrust
discussion was therefore moot but still asserted its validity. See id at 487 n.8.
The Waldman court's reasoning cannot withstand scrutiny. Its analysis of the antitrust
issue overemphasized the incidental restriction on first amendment freedoms and under-
emphasized the governmental interest in maintaining free competition. The court argued
that "[f]or us to hold that [the defendants] must have continued to rely upon strictly written
and oral communication would be to deny them what may have been their only effective
means of communication-arousing public sentiment." 486 F. Supp. at 769. The right of
petition, however, guarantees only that citizens are able to make their wishes known to their
government. It does not guarantee petitioners success in persuading government officials to
act in accordance with those wishes. Written and oral communications are extremely effec-
tive means by which the dealers could have made their wishes known to the Department of
Energy (DOE). The fact that the DOE was not convinced by these communications is not for
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Longshoremen-s Association v. Allied International, Inc. 160 The case involved
section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act,1 6 1 which prohibits
secndary boycotts. 162 The Court, citing O'Brien, dismissed the defend-
ants' claim that restriction of their secondary boycott of Russian prod-
ucts, instituted to protest the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, would
the court to consider when analyzing the dealers' claim that their petitioning rights were
violated.
The Eighth Circuit faced the political boycott issue in Missouri v. National Org. for
Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980). It awarded Noerr-Pennington
immunity to the National Organization for Women's (NOW's) boycott of convention facili-
ties in states that had not yet ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). NOW's goal was
to coerce the legislators of those states to ratify the ERA. The court drew a distinction be-
tween politically motivated boycotts (those aimed at producing social legislation) and com-
mercially motivated boycotts (those aimed at producing economic legislation). See id at 1311-
12. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to politically
motivated boycotts, stating that "the NOW boycott is a tool, not just a competitive purpose,
just as the 'publicity campaign/third-party technique' in Noerrwas a tool. The results of the
tools are the same." Id at 1314; see also Note, Commercial Entities, supra note 153, at 405. But
one may question whether the results truly are the same. The lobbyists in Noerr were con-
cerned with economic legislation. 365 U.S. at 129. Therefore, Noerr cannot support the NOW
court's distinction between political and commercial boycotts. See Note, NOW or Never, supra
note 153, at 1122-25; Comment, supra note 153, at 1136-40. Indeed, the Court's decision in
Penningon indicates that this distinction is altogether inaccurate. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at
670 ("Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials
regardless of intent or purpose."). According to the Pennington analysis, the economic or social
character of the desired legislation is unimportant when considering the issue of antitrust
immunity.
A better approach to the NOWcase would be to apply the O'Brien test. It is obvious that
NOW's boycott was indeed petitioning and therefore was not sham activity. Because this was
a consumer boycott rather than a boycott by competitors, see Osbom, 499 F. Supp. 553 (D.
Del. 1980) (boycott by competing gas dealers), the threat to free competition is minimal.
Restricting political/consumer boycotts is therefore not justified under O'Brien, see supra note
129, and the court's award of Nerr-Penninglon immunity is justified.
160 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
161 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
162 Section 158 provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents--...
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual em-
ployed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employ-
ment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or
work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bar-
gain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees
Although no antitrust violations were alleged, defendants' activity had a sufficient im-
pact on free trade to create at least a colorable antitrust claim.
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infringe on their first amendment rights. 163 The Court would likely use
similar reasoning to deny participants in a political boycott Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity from antitrust liability.164
CONCLUSION
From the inception of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the Supreme
Court has indicated that Noerr-Pennington immunity from antitrust chal-
lenges is based on the first amendment right to petition. When the Cali-
fornia Motor Transport Court "adapted [Noerr] to, the adjudicatory
process," however, it strayed from this foundation. The -Caifornia Motor
Transport analysis seemed to require courts to award Noerr-Pennington im-
muity to any ostensible petitioning activity and then determine whether
the activity fell within the sham "exception" to Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity. This "exception-to-the-exemption" approach shifted the focus of
Noerr-Pennington analysis from its first amendment base, a shift that was
reinforced by some lower courts' use of a rigid set of "requirements" to
determine the applicability of the sham "exception."
In Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit reconciled California Motor Transport with Noerr and Pen-
nington by restoring Noerr-Pennington analysis to its first amendment ori-
gins. Under the Ninth Circuit's first amendment approach, sham claims
or protests are not petitioning because they are not genuine attempts to
influence governmental decisionmaking; such activity therefore does not
deserve Noerr-Pennington immunity in the first instance because it is not
an exercise of a first amendment right. The final aspect of a fully con-
structed Noerr-Pennington analysis based on the first amendment is a logi-
cal extension of the Clipper court's analysis. Petitioning that would
otherwise warrant Noerr-Pennington immunity may be restricted if it
threatens a sufficiently important governmental interest to justify, under
traditional first amendment analysis, the infringement of first amend-
ment freedoms.
Fully stated, Noerr-Pennington immunity shields all genuine attempts
to influence governmental decisionmaking from antitrust attack unless
the government may constitutionally restrict the activity. A close exam-
ination of Noerr-Pennington case law reveals that this analysis explains
163 456 U.S. at 226-27.
164 Although the Court seemed more concerned with protecting the right of free speech
than protecting the right of petition, see id at 226 ("It would seem even clearer that conduct
designed not to communicate but to coerce merits still less consideration under the First
Amendment."), the Court's reluctance to award constitutional protection to group boycotts
based on their coercive nature indicates that the Court probably would find a justified gov-
ernmental restriction of the highly coercive political boycotts and thus would deny Noerr-
Penninglon immunity.
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many of the seemingly inconsistent decisions of antitrust cases involving
different forms of petitioning.
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